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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper aims at explaining the process of institutional change in coral reef management at the village level, 
and mainly seeks to answer two research questions: How do the processes of local institutional change take 
place? What are incentives that drive local communities to participate in them? Investigations in Gili Indah 
village, West Lombok Indonesia show that the process of the institutional change was initiated and done by 
villagers whose livelihood strongly depend on coral reef ecosystems. There are also strong indications that the 
changes were affected by the local and external economic conditions, which inevitably force resource users 
and economic actors to alter their economic strategies. The entering of industrial tourism and the emergence of 
tourism-related livelihoods in Gili Indah has driven economic actors to adapt to the altering environmental 
condition. Tourism Business Operators (TBO) and fishermen, two main actors, have played important roles in 
the change process. TBOs, whose livelihood depends on coral reef ecosystems, have a strong interest in 
protecting the ecosystems from degradation. The same goes for the fishermen, who claim themselves as main 
beneficiaries of coral reef ecosystems, and insist on maintaining the status quo as an attempt to protect their 
economic interest. Two different economic interests have been incentive for an evolution process of local 
institutions (awig-awig) to construct a governance structure that accommodates the varied economic interest. 
So far, this governance structure has been effectively forcing the actors to comply with the rules that drive 
themselves to use the coral reef ecosystems in a sustainable way. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Institutions: Definition, Roles and  
Function 
 
Institutional economics scholars give varied 
definitions of institutions. North (1990: 4) 
defined them as constraints devised to shape 
political, economic and social interactions. 
Schmid (1972) argued that institutions are a 
set of ordered relationships among people that 
define their rights, exposure to the rights of 
others, privileges and responsibilities. Schotter 
(1981) viewed institutions as regulations on 
behavior that are agreed to by all member of a 
society, and which prescribe behavior in 
specific, recurrent situations. 
Ostrom (1990: 51) defined institutions 
as a set of working rules that are used to 
determine who is eligible to make decisions in 
some arena, what actions are allowed or 
constrained, what aggregation rules will be 
used, what procedures must be followed, what 
information must or must not be provided, and 
what payoffs will be assigned to individuals 
dependent on their actions. A more 
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philosophical definition is given by Hamilton 
(1932), who defines an institution as a way of 
thought or action of some prevalence and 
permanence, which is embedded in the habits 
of a group or the customs of a people. A 
similar definition comes from Knight (1992: 
2), who considers an institution to be a set of 
rules that structures social interaction in 
particular ways. Bromley (1989) also regards 
conventions and entitlements as institutions. 
Furubotn and Richter (2000) include property 
rights among the institutions that play an 
important role in allocating economic returns. 
As an institution, based on both formal and 
informal rules, property rights must be 
enforced (Libecap, 1989).  
In the sense of being rules of the 
game—constraints on social interaction, 
regulating the behavior of human beings—
institutions can be classified into informal and 
formal. The first can be social norms, 
customary laws, habits and customs which 
may be created unintentionally or evolve 
spontaneously (North, 1990; Knight, 1992). 
Informal institutions are very important. In a 
chaotic or crises situation due to, for example, 
war, they can be persistent as rules that sustain 
a social construction. Jews, Kurds and 
countless other groups have persisted through 
centuries, despite endless changes in their 
formal rules due to wars, revolutions and 
military occupation. A state may be in ruin, 
but the social norms, culture and habits 
embedded in its communities may continue to 
exist (North, 1990: 35).  
Informal institutions are differentiated 
from formal ones by looking at their forms: 
written or unwritten (North, 1990). Informal 
institutions like taboos, customs and traditions 
are commonly unwritten, while formal 
institutions which include political rules, 
economic rules, contracts and agreements 
generally have a written form. Formal 
institutions have taken a unidirectional move 
from formerly informal ones. Such changes 
are a necessary response of people who are 
moving from less to more complex societies, 
which need standardized weights and 
measurements, and, because they may face 
more complex disputes, naturally need to 
formalize constraints in writing. A move that 
may lower information, monitoring and 
enforcement costs (North, 1990).  
The objective of institutions, both 
formal and informal, is to reduce uncertainty 
by establishing a structure for human 
interaction (North, 1990: 3); to create a degree 
of predictability in human interaction (Kasper 
and Streit, 1998: 1); to channel the behavior of 
human beings in the direction expected by 
community members, to increase certainty and 
social order (Ostrom, 1990: 52); and to reduce 
opportunistic behavior (Ostrom, 1997: 3). An 
institution must also be able to constrain 
individuals, who tend to behave rationally and 
strategically to prioritize their personal 
interests (Knight, 1992: 3), and to equally 
distribute economic returns among economic 
actors (Libecap, 1989).  
In order to avoid misunderstandings 
about the meaning of institutions, it seems 
necessary to clarify the definitions of 
institution and organization. This is so 
because many parties consider the two terms 
to have the same meaning. North (1990: 5) 
defined organizations as structures for human 
interaction, such as political, economic and 
educational bodies. That is, a group of 
individuals tied together by some common 
purpose, to achieve specific objectives. North 
analogizes an organization to a sport team, 
whereas an institution is the set of rules of 
competition that must be complied with by all 
team members. He emphasizes: “the purpose 
of the rules is to define the way the game is 
played. But the objective of the team within 
that set of the rules is to win the game—by a 
combination of skills, strategy, and 
coordination; by fair means and sometimes by 
foul means”. A similar definition to North’s is 
given by Knight (1992: 3), who calls 
organizations collective actors which may be 
subject to institutional constraints that 
generally have an internal structure: an 
institutional framework governing the 
interaction of the persons who constitute the 
organization. 
In respect to this distinction, Uphoff 
(2002) has a rather different view. Instead of 
contrasting institutions with organizations, he 
prefers to classify the first into three classes. 
There are institutions that are not 
organizations, institutions that are also 
organizations and vice versa, and 
organizations that are not institutions. He 
proposes that land tenure, laws, collective 
bargaining, marriage and money belong to the 
first category; federal reserve systems, the 
supreme court, national revenue systems, 
government land registry and the family 
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belong to the second category; and a local 
bank branch, a tutoring service and a 
surveying firm belong to the third.  A similar 
opinion is also advanced by Knight (1992), 
who considers a firm, a governmental 
bureaucracy, a church or a university to be 
simultaneously institutions and organizations.  
In addition to being classified in terms 
of differences in kind, Uphoff (2002: 27) also 
argues that institution and organization should 
be understood as matters of degree. Therefore, 
it is often heard of institutions being described 
as ‘more institutionalized’ or ‘less 
institutionalized,’ or one can also consider an 
institution as being stronger or weaker. This 
means that an institution can be thought of as 
being stronger or weaker depending on how 
public opinion perceives it. If public opinion 
considers that it has a good reputation and 
legitimacy, it will be classified as strong, and 
vice versa. The same approach also applies to 
an organization. It will be regarded as ‘more 
organized’ if public opinion views it as 
reliable, predictable and productive. The more 
reliable, predictable and productive the 
organization is, the stronger it becomes in the 
eyes of the public. In other words, the strength 
or weakness of an institution or an 
organization depends on its capacity, as well 
as its perception by public opinion.  
Further, organizations as well as 
institutions at all levels must deal with four 
basic tasks: decision-making, including 
planning and evaluation; resource mobile-
zation and management; communication and 
co-ordination; and conflict resolution (Uphoff, 
2002). The capacity of the institution or 
organization are assessed by their success in 
performing these basic tasks. The 
organization’s capacity itself depends on the 
number, empowerment and coordination of 
roles, so that activities both within and outside 
of the organization become greater in volume 
and effectiveness, whereas institutional 
capacity refers to the extent to which the 
behavior of people is rendered more concerted 
and consistent, due to shared norms and 
evaluations; status and legitimacy, respect and 
allegiance are accorded and shaped by shared 
beliefs about what is right and proper with 
regard to what each individual should do. 
Regarding the important relationship 
between institutions and organizations, North 
(1990: 6) argued that the emergence of 
organizations and how they evolve is 
fundamentally influenced by institutional 
frameworks, the evolution of which is 
likewise affected by the behavior of 
organizations. In the interaction between 
institutions and organizations, the latter serve 
as agents of institutional change, while the 
former act as the rules of the game.  
To sum up, for the purpose of 
institutional analysis I propose a general 
definition of institution that contains elements 
of the previous explanations. Institutions, both 
formal and informal, are the rules of the game 
for groups of people, communities or 
organizations whose aims are to increase the 
certainty and predictability of interaction 
among human beings by clearly defining the 
limits of legitimate action. The expectation is 
that these rules can give arise to the 
emergence of a well-arranged social order that 
is free of opportunistic and other unproductive 
behaviors.  
 
2. Different Levels of Institutional Change 
Analysis 
 
The classification of institutions into formal 
and informal, as explained above, is 
unfortunately not very useful for conducting 
an institutional change analysis. Instead, 
another way of classification is required. Here 
I discuss the classificational schemes of Oliver 
Williamson and Elinor Ostrom. Williamson 
bases his work on a concept of social analysis 
classified institutions into four levels 
(Williamson, 2000: 569).  He calls the first 
level the social embeddedness level (Figure 
1). Norms, customs, traditions and so forth are 
located here. The changes at this level occur 
very slowly: possibly taking place over the 
course of 100 to 1000 years. Due to their 
slowness, institutional economists do not 
usually treat them as variables of analysis. In 
addition, Williamson also adds that informal 
institutions  at    this    first   level   may   have  
spontaneous origins and stem from an 
evolutionary process (Williamson, 2000). This 
is in line with the classical accounts of 
institutional emergence, as represented by the 
works of David Hume, Adam Smith and 
Herbert Spencer (Knight, 1992). How changes 
to such institutions affect economic 
performance is not clear. Williamson (2000) 
admits that it is a perplexing question to which 
he has no answer.  
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Somewhat opposite in character to the 
first level, the second level refers to the formal 
institutional environment, which is in part 
intentionally designed. However, the criterion 
of intentionality is not absolute, because some 
formal institutions can also derive from the 
evolutionary processes of informal institutions 
(Williamson, 2000: 598). Some currently 
effective formal laws on fishery management 
in Japan, for example, come partly from 
informal institutions that have existed for 
hundreds of years, and are embedded in 
Japanese culture and values (Ruddle, 1993).  
 
                    .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.   Four Levels of Social Analysis                                                
              Source: Williamson (2000: 597) 
 
The analysis of institutional change at 
the second level was initially dominated by 
the economics of property rights, debates on 
which flourished in the 1960s (Williamson, 
2000: 599). The debates began with the 
argument that private-enterprise systems 
cannot function properly unless property 
rights are created over resources. Some 
scholars of institutional economics argued that 
a legal system which can define property 
rights and arbitrate disputes on resources is 
necessary; even they then considered property 
rights to be the central point as if they 
(property rights) could resolve all problems of 
resource allocation.  Those scholars consider 
that once property rights have been defined 
and their enforcement assured, resources are 
allocated to their highest value (Williamson, 
2000: 599). 
Such statements indicate both the 
strength and the weakness of property rights 
theory. The strength is to place property rights 
at the forefront, while the weakness is that 
property rights are given an overly important 
role.  The claim that “legal systems will 
eliminate chaos upon defining and enforcing 
property rights assumes that the definition and 
enforcement of such rights is easy (costless)” 
(Williamson, 2000: 599), and is the 
consequence of giving too great a role to 
property rights. The process of change at this 
level will take decades, or even centuries, 
Embeddedness: informal 
institutions, customs, 
traditions, norms, religion
Institutional environment: 
formal rules of the game, 
especially property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy)
Governance: play of the 
game, especially contract 
(aligning governance 
structures with transactions)
Resource allocation and 
employment (price and 
quantities, incentive 
alignment)
Often noncalculative, 
spontaneous
Get the institutional 
environment right, 1st 
order economizing
Get the governance 
structure right, 2nd 
order economizing
Get the marginal 
conditions right, 3rd 
order economizing
Level Frequency 
(years) 
Propose
100 to 1000
10 to 100
1 to 10
continuous
L1
L2
L3
L4
L1: social theory
L2: economics of property rights/positive political theory
L3: transaction cost economics
L4: neoclassical economics/agency theory
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unless massive disruption, such as through 
war or military occupation occur. 
Williamson (2000: 599) clearly rejects 
these conceptions because the definition and 
enforcement of property rights is not without 
cost. It involves many costly transactions. 
This leads to the third level of analysis, at 
which the governance structures (institutional 
arrangements) are located. The main idea 
behind this level of analysis is that 
transactions such as definition and 
enforcement of institutions is not costless, and 
much in the way of contract management and 
dispute settlements are dealt with directly by 
the parties through private negotiation. 
Therefore, the governance of contractual 
relations becomes the focus of analysis at this 
level. This means that parties involved in 
constructing institutional arrangements will 
attempt to find an efficient governance 
structure, i.e., one that economizes transaction 
costs, through which actors can create order, 
mitigate dispute and realize mutual gains. The 
institutional change process at this level still 
occurs discontinuously, taking from one to ten 
years. Continuous processes occur at the 
fourth level, where institutions change all the 
time following change in economic incentives 
and the effects of prices on resource allocation 
and employment. Institutional changes of this 
level may be a response or an adjustment to 
changes in prices and/or production output, 
the typical subjects of Neoclassical 
Economics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.   Linkage between Rules and Levels of Analysis                                 
              Source: Ostrom (1990: 53) 
 
Rule: Constitutional  rule Collective choice rule Operational rule
Constitutional choice  Collective choice Operational choice Level of Analysis:
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A similar classification of institutional change 
comes from Ostrom (1990: 53), who bases her 
classification on levels of actors’ roles in an 
action situation. She classifies institutional 
change, in the sense of rules, into the levels of 
operational choice, collective choice and 
constitutional choice (Figure 2). This 
classification is useful for analyzing 
institutional change taking place in an action 
arena. Like Williamson’s classification, 
Ostrom also distinguishes institutions by their 
formal and informal status. 
Analysis at the operational-choice level 
aims at analyzing institutions directly 
affecting everyday decisions made by 
resource users concerning when, where and 
how to withdraw resource units; who and how 
action should be monitored; and what 
sanctions should be assigned to rule-breakers 
and what rewards given to those complying 
with the institutions. A higher-level analysis 
occurs at the collective-choice level, where 
analysts are challenged to examine the rules 
used by the resource users—or at least those 
assigned to occupy collective-choice positions 
or positions of external authorities—in 
making the operational rules. In other words, 
the analysis is aimed at examining the rules 
upon which the creation of operational rules is 
based.  The way common-pool resources are 
used is actually decided at this level.  
The most important decisions are taken 
at the constitutional-choice level, the aim of 
which is to examine rules deciding who is 
eligible to work at the collective-choice level 
and to determine the specific rules to be used 
in making collective-choice rules. In other 
words, an analysis of such decisions uncovers 
the rules that shape collective-choice rules. In 
short, according to Ostrom (1990: 53), the 
processes of appropriation, provision, 
monitoring and enforcement occur at the 
operational level. The processes of policy 
making, management and adjudication of 
policy decisions occur at the collective-choice 
level. Formulation, governance, adjudication 
and modification of constitutional decision 
occur at the constitutional level. 
 
 
3. Theories of Institutional Change  
 
With respect to institutional change, Kasper 
and Streit (1998: 396) have classified 
institutions into two kinds: internal and 
external. Internal institutions are the values, 
cultures or norms embodied in a community 
or organization. Such institutions evolve 
through natural mechanisms. The institutions 
that work well for individuals and 
organizations are adopted and emulated, while 
those that do not are discontinued. External 
institutions refer to formal rule systems 
usually designed by the government. They are 
enforced following a top-down pattern on the 
basis of authority and political power. 
Institutions are usually difficult to change, 
even when the outside environment has 
changed.  
Schlüter and Hanisch (1999) have 
classified different theories of institutional 
change into three kinds: (1) institutional 
change based on economic efficiency, whose 
basic idea is to economize transaction costs; 
(2) institutional change based on distributional 
conflict theories; and (3) institutional change 
based on public-choice theory. These three 
basic theories derive from different 
perspectives, which will be elaborated below.  
 
3.1  Institutional change based on economic 
efficiency  
 
The economic theory of institutional change 
has three branches (Schlüter and Hanisch, 
1999). First branch, which is proposed by 
Hayek (1968), holds that institutional change 
takes place unintentionally. Hayek considered 
institutional change to be an unintended result 
of intentional action, and put a lot emphasis 
on the insecurity of the process and the limited 
possibility of cognition of the interaction of 
individuals. The second branch contends that 
institutional change is affected by efforts to 
protect (enforce) and to distribute property 
rights. Scholar whose work related to this 
property right school is, among others, 
Richard Posner who proposed that 
institutional change goes in the direction of 
atomistic property rights (Posner, 1992). The 
third branch bases thinking about institutional 
change on the concept of economizing 
transaction costs.  
For all of their differences, the essence 
of these three economic theories of 
institutional change is that institutional 
changes occur due to Pareto improvement and 
constitute an unintended process, placing 
efficiency as the main driving force. From 
such a perspective, change in relative price 
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and preferences are the main incentives 
driving institutional change (North, 1990). 
Change in the ratio of factor prices (such as 
changes in the ratio of land to labor, labor to 
capital or capital to land), in the cost of 
information, and in technology alter the 
incentives of individuals in their interaction 
with each other, which in the end may induce 
institutional change. North (1990) argued that 
change in relative prices leads parties who are 
engaged in an exchange transaction to 
perceive that the parties could do better with 
an altered agreement. The changes would 
force them to renegotiate existing contracts. 
However, the alteration of contracts or 
agreements is difficult to undertake without 
the changing of the rules of game. Thus, they 
must change the rules, which is principally a 
change of institutions. Those who have a 
sufficient interest in the change may be 
willing to spend a lot of their capital to 
restructure the institution so that it will favor 
their self-interest.  
Changes in preference or taste could 
also undermine the existing rules. A custom, 
tradition or norm ignored become unenforced 
or gradually replaced by a new one when 
individuals come to feel that hitherto existing 
rules are no longer relevant in a new 
environment (North, 1990). This process 
could also be driven by the external economic 
situation.  There are many social groups or 
communities willing to change local informal 
institutions in order to reap short-term 
economic gains. Local institutions prohibiting 
fishermen from capturing coral reef fish 
during a certain period, for example, will be 
considered as an obstacle to getting an 
economic return when the price and/or the 
demand for such fish increases significantly. 
The actors involved in this situation will then 
attempt to negotiate in order to change or 
remove the existing rules.  
A question emerges: who are the agents 
of change? According to North (1990), the 
process of institutional change is mainly 
undertaken by individual entrepreneurs in a 
group or organizations responding to the 
incentives embodied in an institutional 
framework. The organizations in which 
institutional change may occur include firms, 
political organizations, government agencies, 
and communities. Thus, agents of change can 
include not only the individual entrepreneurs, 
or a group of economic actors, but also any 
actors who become involved in activities that 
cause dynamic change in organizations where 
institutions exist. 
 
3.2 Distributional-conflict theories of 
institutional change 
 
Distributional-conflict theories of institutional 
change are principally based on the 
assumption that each strategic actor in an 
action situation has different interests and 
power, which dispose the actors to become 
involved in conflicts of interest. To resolve the 
conflict, the actors attempt to find some 
solution according to power resources that 
they have. The actors who can control power 
resources such as information, political access 
and capital, tend to control and influence the 
process of institutional change and, finally, 
resolve conflicts by changing or creating rules 
that favour their interest. The target of such 
change is to satisfy the interests of individuals, 
not to achieve collective interests (Knight, 
1992: 146). The change processes themselves 
can emerge either intentionally or merely as a 
consequence of the pursuit of strategic 
advantages. 
Distributional-conflict theories of 
institutional change are a universal theory in 
the sense of its capability to explain 
institutional change at all institutional levels, 
and applicable to both formal and informal 
institutions. Changes in informal rules such as 
conventions, social norms and values that are 
inherent in a community can be accomplished 
intentionally, due to different interests and 
asymmetries of power (Knight, 1992: 147). 
According to Knight (1995), changes in the 
distribution of power give self-interested 
actors an incentive to change their institutional 
setting toward one that favors their interest 
(Knight, 1995). He further emphasized that 
the new institutional setting reflects the self-
interest of the economic actors, regardless of 
whether the change will generate a more 
efficient institution or not. Knight (1992) 
contends that it is better to explain the on-
going development of social institutions as a 
by-product of conflict over distribution gain 
than as a Pareto-superior response to 
collective goals or benefits. 
Regarding power, Knight (1992) 
defined it as people’s ability to affect other 
people to act in accordance with their wishes. 
With respect to institutional development, he 
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provides the following example: ‘A’ is more 
powerful than ‘B’ if A intentionally or 
unintentionally can force B to adopt a rule 
whose main idea comes from A or which is 
made by A, even though, in the end, the 
benefit of the institution may be distributed to 
both A and B. The actors or groups of actors 
who possess more power will be in a better 
bargaining position to force the weaker groups 
to comply with institutional rules, whether 
they want to do so or not. They respect these 
institutional rules not because they agree with 
them, nor because the rules evolve as Pareto 
improvements, but simply because they 
cannot do better than to do so.  
Having discussed asymmetric power’s 
influence on institutional change, we arrive at 
a question: What kind of power needs to be 
possessed by strategic actors in order to 
influence institutional change or to create a 
new social institution? With respect to this, 
Knight (1992: 175) offered several key 
components, which he calls “power 
resources”; these include information, 
organisability, credible commitment and 
sanction power.  
(1)  Information is needed in order to 
compete. Strategic actors who endeavor 
to control information and are familiar 
with the expectations and strategy of 
those with whom they interact have a 
greater potential to win the competition. 
With the mastery of information, they can 
choose a strategy that can maximize their 
individual benefits. In other words, they 
can change an established institution or 
create a new one in accordance with their 
wishes.   
(2)  Organisability is important primarily at 
the political level because they can 
influence decision-making process. The 
actors who have good organisability will 
likely have better bargaining power than 
those who do not. They can better 
organize and act collectively.  
(3) Credible commitment is a believable 
attitude demonstrated by actors that they 
will in fact do what they claim to. Actors 
with good credibility of commitment, in 
other words those with a good reputation, 
will more easily convince other actors. 
With this power resource an actor can 
determine the choices of other people 
(Knight, 1992).  
(4) Sanction power is a mechanism used to 
enforce external institutions, that is, a 
threat of sanction by a third-party 
enforcer. It is a common feature of many 
social institutions, such as state or 
powerful group enforcement of sanctions 
against prohibited actions. With this 
power, a group of actors can force others 
to accept their alternative. It can be 
employed so as to discourage a certain 
strategy of actors. To be a successful 
deterrent, the sanction must be 
sufficiently severe so as to reduce the 
potential benefit of violating the 
institution, to the point that this is no 
longer the dominant and preferred 
strategy (Knight, 1992). 
 
3.3 Public  choice  theories of institutional 
change 
 
Public choice theory may also serve as an 
approach for explaining institutional change. 
Schlüter and Hanisch (1999) considered it to 
be a very young branch of institutional-change 
research. It focuses on discussion of 
government’s role in changing or creating 
institutions, and maintains that government or 
political parties act as the driving force or the 
central agent of change (Sened, 1997).  
Therefore, public choice theory of institutional 
change focuses on intentional change of 
formal institutions.  
To sum up, we have discussed different 
theories of institutional changes. Having 
sorted through an abundance of references on 
the subject, we find three main perspectives 
for explaining institutional change. First, 
institutional change is explained on an 
economic basis where efforts to obtain 
efficient transaction costs become the main 
driving force. Second, institutional change is 
explained by distributional-conflict theories, 
which consider redistribution of coercive and 
bargaining resources of power to be the main 
source of institutional change. Third, 
institutional change can be understood 
through public choice theories, according to 
which government or political parties act as 
the main driving forces of change. In 
explaining institutional change, the economic 
approach has three branches. The first says 
that institutional change occurs 
unintentionally, and that changes themselves 
are only by-products of intentional actions. 
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The second branch argues that institutional 
changes are affected by efforts to design, 
enforce or protect property rights, and the 
third is based on transaction-cost theories, 
which argue that institutional changes are the 
consequence of efforts to minimize 
transaction costs. Distributional-conflict 
theories hold that institutional changes are 
triggered by conflict of interest. Efforts to 
resolve conflict bring about the emergence of 
a new institution. These theories emphasize 
that those parties that control power resources 
such as information, organisability, and 
sanction power will be able to control conflict 
and direct institutional changes in accord with 
their interests.  
 
4. Materials and Method 
 
This research was conducted in Gili Indah 
village, West lombok, Indonesia, from May 
until June 2003. In collecting empirical 
information, we applied a triangular 
technique: i.e., a combination of interviews, 
direct observations and document analysis. 
Data collection with interviews involved 42 
respondents representing different 
stakeholders from varied levels. The 
interviews were guided with semi-structured 
and open-ended questionnaire, while 
observations were carried out through 
participating in community activities that 
relate to the research questions. The analyzed 
documents were books, journals, official 
archives, project reports, personal as well as 
official documents. The collected empirical 
information was then analyzed qualitatively 
using mainly analytical framework developed 
by Ostrom (1990).  
 
5. Empirical Findings and Study Results 
 
5.1. Role of Local Institution in Coastal and 
Marine Resource Management in 
Indonesia 
 
Coastal communities in a number of regions 
of Indonesia, particularly in the eastern parts, 
recognize traditional concepts of marine 
resource property rights, which, they call Hak 
Ulayat Laut (HUL). Conceptually this refers 
to a sea tenure system, i.e., an institutional 
arrangement embedded in coastal 
communities that traditionally regulates a 
bundle of rights and responsibilities over 
marine resources (Wahyono, 2000). These 
consist of a number of local institutions 
restricting the pattern of marine resource use, 
setting physical boundaries of resources, 
imposing sanction systems, determining 
property right holders, and so on. Generally, 
these rules relate closely to fishing rights over 
a certain fishing ground, which includes rules 
on fishing methods, fishing equipment, fish 
size, and patterns of fish collection, sharing 
and purchase.  
Furthermore, Wahyono (2000) 
expressed that these local rights vary from one 
place to another. In Maluku, we recognize sasi 
system. It is a social agreement among 
community members on how to manage and 
use fish resources. Bugis-Mandar 
communities in South Sulawesi know a local 
institution that they call rompong system, i.e., 
a traditional set of claims to marine areas, in 
terms of both marine fish cultivation and 
fishing grounds, which exist in the Bugis-
Makasar communities of South Sulawesi 
(Satria et al., 2002). In the district of Sangihe-
Talaud, North Sulawesi, fishermen are tied 
with a seke, i.e., a mechanism of fishery 
resource management.  According to the seke, 
coastal communities in this district recognize 
three main fishing grounds: (a) Sanghe, i.e., 
fishing grounds within or around coral reef 
systems, (b) Elie, i.e., offshore, the furthest 
fishing grounds from the mainland, (c) Inahe, 
i.e., fishing grounds between the other two 
(Wahyono, 2000).  In Lamalera village, 
District of Lembata, East Nusa Tenggara, 
there is a tradition of Ola Nua restricting fish 
capturing activities.  They apply some 
restrictions, such as focusing on catching 
large-sized fish and fishing restriction only 
from May to September (Oleona and Bataona, 
2001). In addition, Ola Nua also prohibit 
fishermen from catching whales in puberty or 
ones that have recently given birth and apply 
selected fishing equipment. These traditions 
that regulate fish size, establishment of a 
closed season and so on are attempts to protect 
the resources from greedy exploitation. 
Local institutions on coastal and marine 
resource management are also recently found 
among coastal communities of Lombok, such 
as in the villages of Tanjung Luar, 
Pemongkong, Ekas Bay, Sariwe Bay and 
Jukung Bay, in the district of East Lombok. 
These awig-awig are on zoning of inshore 
fishing ground, coastal zoning and restriction 
of fishing equipment. For instance, awig-awig 
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in Ekas Bay divides the region into three 
zones: (a) Zone I, from the coastline up to 
three miles into the sea, measured at the 
lowest ebb tide; (b) Zone II, between three 
and six miles from the coast; and (c) Zone III, 
over six miles from the coast. The first zone is 
allocated for traditional fishermen who apply 
simple fishing technology, such as pancing, 
jala (casting nets), bubu (plaited rattan or 
bamboo fishing traps), bagang, spears, arrows 
and other simple fishing tools. In this zone, 
trawl/dragnet, mini trawl, long line, muroami 
and other fishing devices of the same or 
higher class are forbidden. The same 
restrictions apply to Zone II as well. All 
fishing devices allowed in Zone I can be 
applied here, however. Zone III is allocated 
for all fishermen in the sense that all fishing 
technologies except bombs and other 
destructive fishing tools can be used (Satria et 
al., 2002). In addition to a zoning system, the 
regional awig-awig also sets a number of 
more specific restrictions.  
In communities along the coastal region 
of West Lombok district, a number of local 
rules with respect to marine resource 
protection also exist. In Kayangan and 
Sukadana, coastal villages located in the 
northern part of Lombok Island, two local 
rules regarding marine resource protection are 
found. The fishermen community of 
Kayangan applies a sawenan concept 
(Hidayat, 2005), i.e., a closed season for 
fishing, usually from the first of July or 
August to the 31st of July or August every 
year. The exact schedule (whether in July or 
in August) is usually determined through a 
convention of all fishermen members of the 
village, led by the mangku (the leader of 
traditional fishermen). The beginning of 
sawenan is signaled by hanging out flags at 
the border of the village.  
The Sawenan is effective not only for 
Kayangan fishermen but also for those who 
come from other villages. Therefore, as the 
closed season begins, the Mangku will send 
letters to other village leaders, informing them 
that during a certain period of time the fishing 
activities within Kayangan waters are 
prohibited. Therefore, those from other 
villages cannot break the restriction by 
pretending that they do not know the closed 
season schedule. The end of the period is 
signaled by a big traditional ceremony called 
nyawen. On that day, the fishermen are 
allowed to capture fish again. However, all of 
caught fish must be dedicated to the 
ceremony’s needs. No fisherman is allowed to 
take the fish home. Other food needed like 
rice, spices, vegetables or cakes will be 
provided by the fishermen’s families. In 
addition to the feast, the community member 
will present any kinds of traditional shows, 
such as dances, songs and so on to brighten 
the occasion.   
The prohibition of fishing during the 
sawenan is highly respected due to the heavy 
sanctions imposed on violators (Hidayat, 
2005). Those who offend against the 
restriction will be made to stay in the beach 
waters for one hour while being watched by 
all villagers. In addition, he must also hold a 
party at the beach dedicated to the villagers, 
especially the fishermen and their families, for 
which he needs to slaughter a goat, and 
provide rice and other food. This is considered 
to be a ceremonial meal in consequence of the 
violation. This sanction is so effective that no 
fisherman ever fishes during the period. 
Fishermen of Kayangan village respect the 
restrictions established by their awig-awig.  
In addition to the prohibition of fishing 
during the sawenan period, the community of 
the village is also prohibited from applying 
destructive fishing methods. According to the 
local rules, bombs, poison, Muroami and other 
fishing methods considered damaging to the 
marine environment are not allowed. The 
rules also forbid cutting down mangroves or 
other kinds of coastal trees and taking away 
pieces of coral reef, either dead or, moreover, 
live specimens. The sanctions related to these 
restrictions vary, ranging from the necessity of 
putting the reef back into the sea, to social 
sanctions or handing the violators over to the 
police, particularly those suspected of using 
destructive fishing methods.  
In Sukadana village, 10 kilometers 
north of Kayangan, there also exists awig-
awig prohibiting destructive fishing methods. 
Violation of this rule will also provoke a 
heavy sanction: a penalty of between 
Rp5,000,000 and Rp10,000,000 ($625 to 
$1,250), depending on the severity of the 
violation (Hidayat, 2005). Bomb and poison 
users are regarded as the biggest offenders 
and, without any mercy, will be given the 
maximum (heaviest) punishment. Besides 
that, boats, motors or other fishing devices 
proven to be used during the violation must be 
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handed over to the fishermen’s association. If 
the violators repeat the same act, they will 
receive a traditional punishment in the form of 
severe “beating”. A third time offender will be 
brought to the police and dealt with according 
to the prevailing formal laws. These rules, as 
with the others, are normally effective enough 
to halt destructive fishing activities.  
 
5.2. Awig-awig for Coral Reef Mana-
gement in Gili Indah Village, West 
Lombok 
 
In Gili Indah, there has been three awig-awigs 
on coral reef management. Two of them are 
for preventing destructive fishing practices, 
while the other one deals with conflict 
resolution.  
(1) First awig-awig on prohibiting blast 
fishing 
This awig-awig, which came into 
existence in 1999, only consists of two kinds 
of social sanction applied to those caught blast 
fishing. First, nobody is allowed to accept any 
kind of invitation for a social event from the 
blast-fisherman, and second, no blast-
fishermen will receive administration services 
from the village. This sanction worked 
effectively only during the first few months of 
its implementation. There was indeed a case 
where one blast-fisherman stopped his 
destructive fishing activities because of this 
sanction (Hidayat, 2005). However, in the 
following months, people did not respect it 
anymore. The community members were not 
afraid of the social sanctions. Blast-fishermen 
living outside Gili Indah also did not show 
any respect to the awig-awig. Finally, it 
became utterly ineffective and fishermen 
resumed applying destructive fishing methods 
as before. This raised many complaints from 
diving companies (Bachtiar, 2000). How this 
awig-awig came into existence and why it was 
not effective will be further discussed in 
Section 5.3. 
(2) Second awig-awig prohibiting blast fishing 
This awig-awig came into force on 19 
March 2000. As with the first, this awig-awig 
is also very simple. It merely consisted of 
three stipulations regarding blast fishing, as 
follows: (a) fishermen who capture fish using 
bombs or potassium or other poisonous 
substances will be arrested. In front of the 
fishermen’s society, SATGAS, and village 
officials, the arrested violator will be 
questioned with respect to their activities. 
They will then be requested to sign an 
agreement on not repeating the violation, and 
must pay a fine of up to Rp10,000,000 
($1,250). If they cannot afford to pay the 
penalty, they will be sent to the police to be 
processed according to formal law. (b) If the 
violators are rearrested and proven to have 
repeated the same violation, the fishermen’s 
society will destroy the fishing equipment 
used during the violation. Additionally, the 
violator must also repeat the first sanction. (c) 
If a third time offender is caught, he will be 
traditionally punished by enduring a severe 
“beating”.  
(3) Awig-awig on conflict resolution 
Another awig-awig effective in Gili 
Indah is one concerning the resolution of 
conflicts between fishermen and TBOs. It is 
called the awig-awig on Coastal Zoning of 
Gili Indah Islands. This was the first awig-
awig formalized by the village administration, 
issued on 28 September 1998. Three years 
later, the village made changes to some parts 
of its content. The revised edition was then 
launched on 1 September 2001.  
The revised awig-awig consists of 10 
sections and 33 articles. Section one discusses 
about general definitions, while section two to 
section four respectively discusses zoning of 
the coastal areas of Gili Air, Gili Meno, Gili 
Trawangan. Section five is related to zones for 
diving and fishing, section six is on 
stipulations regarding marine biota collection 
and pearl-clam culture, and section seven 
concerns with institutions and financial 
sources for management tasks. Section eight is 
about sanctions, while section nine lays down 
transitional stipulations, and the last is a 
closing section. Based on this awig-awig, as 
stated in sections two to section four, use of 
the coastal regions of Gili Indah is divided 
into six zones, A, B, D, E, F and G (see 
Figure 3 and Table 1). 
Of the articles regulating zoning as 
described above, there is an article that firmly 
establishes several locations specially 
intended for diving activities, where other 
types of activities, particularly catching fish 
using Muroami, are not allowed. Additionally, 
there are also articles on sanctions, prohibition 
of fishing using bombs and potassium, 
prohibition of the mining of coral stones and 
collection of large shellfish and turtles, neither 
for commercial nor personal purposes. 
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Fig. 3. Zoning of Coastal Areas of Gili Indah according to Awig-awig on Conflict Resolution                
                Source:   Bachtiar (2000) 
 
Violation of the stipulations determined 
within this awig-awig will be monetarily 
sanctioned. Violators must pay Rp15,000 
($1.8) for anchoring within a forbidden 
location; Rp1,000,000 ($125) for fishing using 
Muroami; Rp100,000 ($12.5) for using a 
Mogong; and Rp5,000,000 ($625) for diving 
within a prohibited location (i.e., a Muroami 
fishing ground) (see Table 7-3). The money 
collected from penalty payments are saved by 
the village administration to be used for public 
facilities construction.  
If we have a closer look at Table 1 and 
Figure 2, we find that fishermen are 
prohibited from applying Muroami in all 
zones. When they fish within diving or 
landing zones they have to pay Rp1000,000. 
Actually, diving companies also must pay 
Rp5,000,000 to fishermen if there are divers 
dive within Muroami locations (i.e., beyond 
the zones stipulated in the awig-awig); 
however, they would not dive there, because 
the coral reefs which exist in these locations 
are too deep. In fact, these are not good 
locations either for diving or for fishing. Thus, 
Muroami users demand that they should be 
allowed to use the same locations as diving 
companies. Fishermen considered that the 
zoning stipulations were unfair and damaged 
their interests; therefore they became 
dissatisfied with or did not totally accept the 
awi-awig. This continued to be a source of 
conflict, which finally erupted into a physical 
confrontation on 17 August 2002. This 
conflict motivated the conflicting parties to 
make changes in the awig-awig. 
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Table 1. Allowed and Prohibited Activities and Sanctions within the Zoning System for the  
Coastal Areas of Gili Indah 
 
Zone Allowed Activities Prohibited Activities Sanctions 
A • Diving 
• Snorkeling  
• Fishing with Muroami  
• Fishing with Mogong 
• Angling, spearing or shooting 
fish with arrows from boats or by 
trampling 
• Setting anchors of tourist 
(regular) boats  
• Setting anchor of fishing boats 
• Seaweed cultivation 
• Penalty: Rp1,000,000 
• Penalty: Rp100,000 
• Penalty: Rp15,000 
 
 
 
• Penalty: Rp50,000 
 
• Penalty: Rp15,000 
 
• Removal of seaweed 
cultivation facilities 
B • Diving 
• Snorkeling 
• Angling, spearing 
or shooting fish 
with arrows from 
boats 
• Fishing with Muroami  
• Fishing with Mogong 
• Angling, spearing or shooting 
fish with arrows by trampling 
• Setting anchors of tourist 
(regular) boats  
• Setting anchor of fishing boats 
• Seaweed cultivation 
• Penalty: Rp1,000,000 
• Penalty: Rp100,000 
• Penalty: Rp15,000 
 
• Penalty: Rp50,000 
• Penalty: Rp15,000 
• Removal of seaweed 
cultivation facilities 
D • Diving 
• Snorkeling 
• Angling, spearing 
or shooting fish 
• Fishing with Muroami  
• Fishing with Mogong 
• Setting anchors of regular 
(tourist) boats  
• Penalty: Rp1,000,000 
• Penalty: Rp100,000 
• Penalty: Rp50,000 
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with arrows from 
boats or by 
trampling 
• Setting anchor of fishing boats • Penalty: Rp15,000 
 
Table continued 
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Table 1 continued 
 
Zone Allowed Activities Prohibited Activities Sanctions 
E • Diving 
• Snorkeling 
• Angling, spearing or 
shooting fish with 
arrows from boats or 
by trampling 
• Seaweed cultivation 
• Setting anchors of 
fishing boats 
• Fishing with Muroami  
• Fishing with Mogong 
• Setting anchors of regular 
(tourist) boats 
 
• Penalty: Rp1,000,000 
• Penalty: Rp100,000 
• Penalty: Rp50,000 
F • Diving 
• Snorkeling 
• Angling, spearing or 
shooting fish with 
arrows from boats or 
by trampling, fishing 
with nets 
• Seaweed cultivation 
• Setting anchors of 
regular (tourist) boats 
• Fishing with Muroami  
• Unloading passengers 
 
• Penalty: Rp1,000, 000 
• Penalty: Rp15,000 
 
G • Setting anchors of 
regular (tourist) boats 
• Unloading 
passengers  
• Fishing with Muroami 
• Seaweed cultivation  
 
• Penalty: Rp1,000,000 
• Removal of seaweed 
cultivation facilities 
 
Source: Kantor Desa Gili Indah (2001); Note: Rp1 ≈ US$0.125 or US$1 ≈ Rp 8,000 
 
 
 
 
 
In March 2003, they agreed to make 
changes in the rules and add additional points 
to the stipulation of zoning and sanctions. The 
additional sanctions say that: (1) the 
association of fishermen has the right to earn 
money from Ecotrust amounting to 
Rp3,000,000 ($375) per month as a 
compensation for not being allowed to fish in 
certain zones. (2) If Ecotrust does not pay the 
money for three months, the association of 
fishermen may consider the agreement 
invalid, and may resume catching fish as they 
did prior to the existence of the agreement. (3) 
If association members fish within a forbidden 
zone, SATGAS has the right to arrest them 
and confiscate their fishing devices for one 
month; nevertheless they still have the right to 
receive the compensation from Ecotrust. (4) If 
a second violation occurs, the fishermen will 
receive the same sanction as for the first 
infraction, but without receiving the 
compensation. In addition to those changes, 
the new agreement explicitly gives SATGAS 
the authority to implement the rules. It may 
arrest whomever is suspected of operating 
Muroami within the forbidden areas. These 
changes in the zoning and other additional 
stipulations have not yet been formally 
established as a village decree; however, the 
concerned parties agreed that these are 
considered to be a valid change of the rules.  
Given the process of emergence, 
community members have formalized the 
rules intentionally. Therefore, these are 
categorized as formal rules which are 
continuously co-evolving in communities, in 
line with the changes of the environment, in 
spite of their only regulating simple matters at 
the village level. This differs from informal 
rules which only refer to those coming into 
existence unintentionally through a process of 
social selection, spontaneous emergence and 
exchange coordinated by the market (Knight, 
1992).  
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5.3 Processes of Institutional Change 
 
The analysis of institutional change 
undertaken in this section principally refers to 
the three levels of institutional analysis 
elaborated by Ostrom (1990), which have 
been discussed in Subchapter 2. Ostrom 
divided the analysis into operational rules, 
collective-choice rules and constitutional-
choice rules. Section 5.3 focuses on analyzing 
the process of change in operational-level 
rules taking place at the collective-choice 
level. At this level, there are different actors 
and stakeholders involved, such as village 
officials, village elites, LMNLU, SATGAS, 
the fishermen’s association, and Ecotrust. 
Meanwhile, at the operational-choice level, 
there are local communities, SATGAS, 
Ecotrust, APGA, and Kelompok Pengelola 
Lingkungan Terumbu Karang (KPLTK) 
acting as the rule enforcers.  
Analysis of collective-choice rules (the 
way the actors at the collective-choice level 
make operational-level rules) and 
constitutional-level rules (the way actors come 
into the collective-choice level and obtain 
authority to work there) will be found in 
Section 5.3.2. Since the study has 
predominantly focused on issues of rule 
implementation and on local institutions, the 
analysis at the two higher levels is not as 
detailed as that concerning the operational 
rules level. This is so because I have not found 
clearly formalized rules working at these two 
levels. What I have found was only traditional 
and governmental regulations that seem to be 
applied to all kinds of village policy making, 
and are not specifically related to coral reef 
management.  
 
5.3.1 Change in Operational Rules 
 
The following three cases demonstrate 
operational-level rule changes at the village 
level. The first two is concerned with changes 
in the rules for stopping destructive fishing 
practices, while the last case is on conflict 
resolution.   
 
Case 1. The process of emergence of the first 
local rule prohibiting destructive fishing 
 
Figure 4 describes the emergence of the first 
awig-awig prohibiting blast fishing. As 
mentioned several times previously, this awig-
awig came into existence in order to deal with 
the uncontrollable proliferation of 
environmentally destructive fishing practices. 
TBOs and some fishermen from the local 
community, who were very concerned with 
this situation, expected to have a local 
institution dealing with this problem. Village 
administration officials and some village elites 
responded to their concern (Hidayat, 2005). 
By playing the role of policy makers at the 
collective-choice level, village administration 
officials and village elite attempted to 
formulate an operational rule that sought to 
restrict destructive fishing activities. For 
implementation, the rule was then handed 
over to local community members. This 
means that the local community plays a role as 
rule executor at the operational level.  
As shown by Figure 4, implementation 
of the rule was handed over to the local 
community. Why was it not dealt with by the 
village administration, which officially serves 
as the village’s ruling body? This question can 
be answered by looking closely at what 
actually happened. The rule was intended to 
stop blast-fishing, and this supported the 
interests of some environmentally concerned 
fishermen and TBOs. However, on the side of 
blast-fishermen, the rule essentially hurts their 
interests. The village administration officers 
avoided implementing the rule because they 
did not want to be regarded as treating 
community members unjustly or to be accused 
of siding with the TBOs and opposing the 
interests of fishermen. Both blast-fishermen 
and TBOs are inhabitants of the same village 
and have the right to receive equal treatment 
from village officials. In other words, specific 
to this case, the village administration 
officials, who should be the servants of all 
village groups, would be considered to be 
unfairly acting against the fishermen’s 
interests if they served as implementers of an 
awig-awig that was seen as being more 
beneficial for TBOs. For the village officials, 
this situation became a dilemma; thus they 
made a decision to hand over implementation 
authority to local community members
. 
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Fig. 4.  The Mechanism of the Emergence of the First Awig-awig Prohibiting Blast- Fishing in 
Governing Coral Reef Ecosystems  
  Source: Hidayat (2005) 
 
However, the implementation was in fact 
ineffective. This could have been caused by 
several factors: (1) the awig-awig does not 
specifically determine a group authorized to 
implement it: to conduct patrol and 
monitoring tasks. Self-enforcement by the 
villagers could not work because they tended 
to flout the rule through, for example, hiding 
the suspected violators if the latter happened 
to be their family members, relatives, or at 
least close friends or neighbors. (2) The awig-
awig did not receive complete support from 
the community. They considered that those 
who played decision-making roles at the 
collective-choice level were not being 
representative of all community groups. In 
other words, they did not represent the entire 
community but only part of it. (3) It also had 
no support from the higher government 
bodies.  
Case 2. The process of emergence of the 
second local rule prohibiting destructive 
fishing 
The ineffectiveness of the first attempt 
to formulate awig-awig that would stop 
destructive fishing practices resulted in a 
reaction with protests from the TBOs. They 
insisted that the village administration was 
responsible for the failure. In a village 
meeting with community members that took 
place on 1 January 2000, they proposed to 
create a local task force to take over security 
tasks regarding the reef ecosystems. However, 
at that moment the village officials did not 
give a satisfactory response (Hidayat, 2005). 
Strongly motivated and willing to take real 
measures to secure the reef ecosystems, 
eventually on 16 January 2000 some young 
people from Gili Trawangan who were 
concerned with coral reef ecosystem 
sustainability successfully built the task force 
called SATGAS. On 1 February 2000, the 
SATGAS Gili Meno unit was built and 
followed by SATGAS Gili Air on 15 March 
2000. At first, SATGAS could not tackle the 
work well. This is so because it had no right to 
work on behalf of the villagers, who did not 
give them a legal mandate to implement the 
established rules. Realizing that they were 
facing institutional problems, they initiated the 
creation of a new awig-awig. Then, they 
collaborated with North Lombok fishermen, 
who at the same time were facing fishing 
problems resulting from blast fishing 
practices. For easing the achievement of their 
goal, on 16 March 2000, the fishermen formed 
LMNLU, which aimed at facilitating the 
activities of those who were concerned with 
destructive fishing practices toward 
establishing awig-awig against blast-fishing.  
Taking part in the formation process of 
the LMNLU were the heads of the entire 
village administrations located along the 
coastal region of North Lombok, plus the 
L o c a l  c o m m u n i t y  
• D i f f e r e n t  a c to r s  
• D i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t s
O p e r a t i o n a l  C h o ic e  L e v e l
V i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s  a n d   
v i l l a g e  e l i t e s
F i r s t  a w ig - a w ig o n  a n t i -
b l a s t  f i s h in g  a c t i v i t i e s
C o l l e c t i v e  C h o ic e  L e v e l
F o r m u la t i o n  
C o r a l  R e e f  E c o s y s t e m s  
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Camats of the subdistricts of Tanjung, 
Gangga, Gondang and Bayan. There was also 
a representative of BKSDA. No sooner had 
the LMNLU been established than it executed 
its first task. Together with SATGAS, on 19 
March 2000 it created the second awig-awig 
against blast fishing, which gave SATGAS 
complete authority for implementation. The 
awig-awig itself was signed by the heads of 
LMNLU, SATGAS, and the heads of the 
village administrations. The strength of this 
organization at its birth was politically quite 
robust because it was supported by the village 
and government officials, which is proven by 
their presence at the event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5  The Mechanism of the Emergence of the Second Awig-awig Prohibiting- Blast Fishing in 
Governing Coral Reef Ecosystems 
               Source:  Hidayat (2005) 
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Success in establishing a new awig-awig did 
not, however, mean that SATGAS could 
immediately undertake the patrol and 
monitoring tasks. They were then faced with 
financial problems. In order to patrol and 
monitor, they needed to cover operational 
cost. Initially, they managed it through funds 
raised among SATGAS officers and some 
TBOs. However, the collected money was still 
far from being enough to conduct even a 
weekly patrol. In addition, they could not 
always count on receiving these contributions 
regularly. Due to such difficulties, in April 
2000 SATGAS officers and some TBOs 
initiated the building of Ecotrust, which serves 
as a means for raising conservation funds to 
support SATGAS’s activities. In April 2001, 
the TBOs residing on Gili Air formed APGA, 
which has the same purpose. The emergence 
of the two local organizations has helped 
SATGAS raise funds so that they can better 
fulfill the tasks.  
Figure 5 shows the mechanism of the 
emergence of the second local institution 
(awig-awig on blast fishing), which 
principally is similar to the first one. What 
makes it different is the presence of LMNLU 
and SATGAS at the collective-choice level. 
As occurred during the first process, their 
tasks are also to formulate awig-awig, the 
implementation of which is then handed over 
to SATGAS, Ecotrust and APGA each of 
whom has clearly defined authority and 
responsibility. In addition, the new awig-awig 
also obtained informal political support from 
BKSDA. 
Compared to the first edition, the 
modified awig-awig had the possibility to 
work more effectively. There are some factors 
that may have contributed to this: (1) the 
appearance of LMNLU and SATGAS at the 
collective-choice level. The former represents 
a fishermen’s community that is concerned 
with the ecosystems and the latter is much 
closer to TBOs, which also have the same 
interest. (2) The handover of authority to 
SATGAS for the implementation of the awig-
awig has enabled them to work on behalf of 
the community members and to be able to 
implement the ruled fairly, aiming only at 
safeguarding coral reef ecosystems. Thus, 
they could treat the violators fairly in spite of 
having to face their own family members, 
relatives, close friends or neighbors. (3) The 
support from the village administration and 
BKSDA is also very important. Despite not 
being involved at the collective-choice level, 
their encouragement played a strategic role. 
The BKSDA’s involvement could be taken to 
mean its willingness to share monitoring 
authority with others. (4) The existence of a 
clear sanction system, monitoring authority, 
recognition of rights to organize, and 
collective-choice arrangements are also very 
influential. These could be seen to 
approximate the conditions for successful 
collective action in CPR management 
(Ostrom, 1990). 
 
Case 3. The process of how rules on conflict 
resolution come into existence 
 
The lasting conflict of interest between 
fishermen (Muroami users) and TBOs (diving 
companies) led to institutional change. The 
change occurred within the framework of 
finding a solution to this conflict. 
Investigation by Hidayat (2005) revealed that 
people were very concerned about the 
conflict. They suggested to create an awig-
awig on how to deal with the conflict. Some 
others proposed that the coastal areas of the 
village be divided into several zones, which 
they discussed in several meetings with 
village administration officials. The idea for 
zoning was very simple: there could be zones 
for fishing, diving, seaweed cultivation and 
boat landing. Each zone would be based on 
economic activities taking place at the 
moment in the locality. However, there was a 
lack of capability regarding how to organize 
and materialize the idea. In addition, there was 
insufficient knowledge of how to make 
measurements for drafting a simple map.  
The idea of the local community to 
formulate awig-awig on the issue matched 
with the concerns of the Coral Reef 
Rehabilitation and Management Plan 
(COREMAP) project, whose part in the 
program was to build the capacity of the local 
community to conduct resource management. 
The Regional Planning and Development 
Board (BAPPEDA), which at that moment 
became a regional partner of the project, 
offered the village administration help to 
facilitate their creation of awig-awig on 
coastal zoning. The BAPPEDA then asked the 
Research Center for Language and Culture 
(P2BK) of Mataram University to facilitate 
the local community in making the awig-awig. 
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Then, the work became the responsibility of 
P2BK. In other words, P2BK received a 
project from BAPPEDA in which it would 
play a decision-making role at the collective-
choice level (see Figure 6).  
In executing the work, P2BK did a 
survey regarding the coastal zoning wished by 
the local community. Unfortunately, the 
survey was not well received. The first 
meeting (16 May 1998) between local 
community and facilitators was only attended 
by a few local representatives of fishermen 
and none of the TBOs (Hidayat, 2005). The 
aim of the fishermen coming to the meeting 
was not actually to participate in the process 
of creating awig-awig; rather, they expected to 
receive a soft loan or any kind of financial aid 
from the government. The second meeting (10 
June 1998) was only attended by village 
officials and some village elites who 
absolutely did not represent the conflicting 
groups. However, because the making of the 
awig-awig was a “government project”, which 
was already budgeted, it had to be continued. 
Therefore, they continued to carry out the 
third meeting, on 23 July 1998, with a single 
agenda to establish zones for the coastal areas 
of Gili Indah. Finally, on 28 September 1998, 
Gili Indah village issued its first formalized 
awig-awig (i.e., in written form).              .
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6  The Mechanism of the Emergence of Local Institution on Conflict Resolution in Coral 
Reef Management 
Source:  Hidayat (2005) 
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In spite of being totally supported by 
BAPPEDA, representatives of district 
governments, and village officials, this awig-
awig was still ineffective. Based on the 
findings of this study, there are some likely 
reasons that may explain this outcome:  
1) P2BK played a decision-making role at the 
collective-choice level without having a 
mandate from the local community. It was 
only a consultant that carried out an order 
from the BAPPEDA (government) with 
the target of formulating and putting in 
place a new set of rules (awig-awig). 
Because of this situation, it did not receive 
any support from the local community. 
This was worsened by the community’s 
antipathy toward the government, due to 
its bad reputation. The local community 
called the awig-awig a ‘government 
project product’. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that it did not work at all. 
2) The awig-awig specifically assigns 
KPLTK (see footnote 5) as the 
implementer. However, the group, which 
must be led by the head of the village 
administration, was never formed. It was to 
be a top-down-determined organization, 
one which would not grow from the 
ground up. According to Hidayat’s 
findings, the whole people whose names 
stated in the organization structure of 
KPLTK have never been consulted for 
their approval for the position; they were 
only chosen unilaterally by P2BK 
(Hidayat, 2005). 
3) After having had BAPPEDA know the 
ineffectiveness of the KPLTK, BAPPEDA, 
always in a command role, then handed the 
awig-awig over to the village 
administration. The latter was asked to 
socialize the awig-awig among the local 
community members. The community 
members categorically refused it, because 
they felt no necessity to be bound by an 
institution made without their real 
participation. Naturally, given this 
rejection, the village administration had 
trouble convincing the people to respect 
the new rule. Therefore, even though it 
was totally supported by the government, 
the new awig-awig could not function as 
hoped. This could be a clear indicator that 
the local community support is far more 
important than that of the government.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7   The Process of Institutional Change on Conflict Resolution in Coral Reef Management   
                                                                              
 Source: Hidayat (2005) 
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BAPPEDA, as well as some NGOs which are 
concerned with the three islands, considered 
the awig-awig to be a failure. As the project 
initiator, BAPPEDA, was not satisfied with 
the unsuccessful awig-awig. It assumed that 
the failure resulted from a lack of local 
community support. Accordingly, it intended 
to change the rule so that the local community 
would be given more opportunities to be 
involved. The change process was executed 
by the village administration officials, along 
with some representatives of the fishermen’s 
group and SATGAS (Figure 7). They became 
new players in the collective choice arena, 
aiming to change the institution. To achieve 
the purpose, BAPPEDA provided them with a 
budget. The change process initially 
succeeded in drawing elements of the local 
community to participate. The first meeting 
for discussing the awig-awig revision, on 4 
August 2001, was able to attract a number of 
group representatives. Those who received the 
mandate from BAPPEDA were also formally 
successful in executing their task, as proven 
by the changes in some parts of the institution.  
The revised awig-awig was published 
on 1 September 2001. Present at the event 
were village officials, head of the district 
government, representatives of BAPPEDA, 
and other officials. They were satisfied with 
the rule revision and believed that the new 
awig-awig would work. However, in its 
implementation, the awig-awig failed again. 
The conflicts of interest between Muroami 
users and TBOs still existed, and people did 
not show any respect to the newly revised 
awig-awig. Again, the rules existed only on 
paper. The physical conflict between Muroami 
users and TBOs, which erupted on 17 August 
2002, convinced everyone of their failure. The 
following paragraphs attempt to explain 
possible reasons behind the repeated failures. 
1) The change process had failed to involve 
representatives of all relevant groups, in 
particular those involved in the conflict. 
According to my investigation, not all of 
Muroami users participated in the change 
process. They were not interested in 
getting involved because they mistrust the 
village administration, due to the bad 
reputation of the latter. They knew that the 
village administration received money 
from BAPPEDA, amounting to around 
Rp15,000,000 ($1,765), to be used for the 
process of changing the awig-awig, 
including its familiarization within the 
community. Unfortunately, according to 
some interviewed fishermen (05/F/50; 
09/F/30), SATGAS officials, and 
subvillage leaders, the allocation of the 
money was not transparent; hence, they 
strongly suspected that there was a misuse 
of it by village officials for personal 
interests. This has resulted in some upsets 
within the groups, creating a feeling of 
indifference toward changes in the awig-
awig. Therefore, in spite of getting support 
from many elements at the first stage of the 
process, in the next steps a decline in 
participation was evident. As a 
consequence, the change was only 
executed by a few people, who indeed did 
not represent all conflicting parties. 
2) In addition to the increasing indifference to 
the change process, the rules did not 
become workable due to the failure of 
determining who should actually be 
responsible for their implementation. There 
were some changes made, but important 
stipulations were still missing. SATGAS, 
which had been successful in enforcing the 
awig-awig prohibiting blast fishing, was 
not given the mandate to execute the new 
version. In other words, unclarity in 
allocation of responsibility among entities 
at the operational-choice level also 
contributed to the failure. The 
implementation itself was handed over to 
the village administration.  
3) The failure to change the institution also 
resulted from BAPPEDA’s attitude, which 
tried to rush the completion of the work. 
This is again related to the outcome-
oriented approach to the project. As the 
new rules were receiving resistance or 
refusal from some community elements, 
particularly fishermen, BAPPEDA should 
actually have been more patient: trying to 
convince them that the awig-awig would 
be beneficial for them, and that they 
themselves would not be victimized by it. 
Because the local community has 
developed a deeply imprinted negative 
perception toward government officials, it 
is time consuming to change it.  
Let me emphasize that the key to the 
failure was the disagreement of some 
fishermen regarding the established coastal 
area zoning system. The situation of failed 
attempts at coming to a satisfactory solution 
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for all concerned moved all parties to 
conscientiously attempt to again modify the 
rules toward a workable means of conflict 
resolution. This process was initiated by the 
conflicting parties themselves. Both fishermen 
and diving companies expected to 
immediately end the conflict, which was 
counterproductive for both sides. Learning 
from experience, they did not want to repeat 
the same failure. Therefore, they made the 
changes by themselves without much 
intervention from external stakeholders. The 
village administration, which previously dealt 
with the failed attempts at change, now only 
acted as a facilitator. Those who played roles 
at the collective-choice level were Ecotrust, 
SATGAS, and the Fishermen’s Association. 
The first represent diving companies, while 
the last represents fishermen, specifically 
Muroami users. Meanwhile, SATGAS also 
got involved, with respect to its role as law 
enforcer. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 The Final Process of Institutional Change on Conflict Resolution in Coral Reef 
Management 
Source        Hidayat (2005) 
 
The process of change took place between 17 
August 2002 and 5 March 2003: a time of 
negotiation, within which many meetings and 
discussions on coastal zoning took place. 
Ecotrust, SATGAS, and the fishermen’s 
representatives participated in these 
negotiations, whose principal aim was to 
change the local rules so as to satisfy all 
interests and make way for a solution to the 
chronic conflict. After eight months of tough 
negotiation, finally, on 5 March 2003, an 
agreement concerning the establishment of a 
new coastal zoning sytem was signed by the 
head of the fishermen’s association and the 
head of Ecotrust, along with the heads of the 
village and SATGAS. According to the new 
agreement, Muroami users are not allowed to 
fish within certain areas; however, they have 
the right to receive compensation fees. In 
addition, SATGAS has the authority to 
conduct monitoring activities as well as take 
necessary action against violators of the 
agreement.  
Figure 8 shows how the representatives 
of each conflicting group changed the local 
institution. Ecotrust, representing TBOs, and 
the fishermen’s association, speaking on 
behalf of fishermen, as well as SATGAS, all 
played an active role in the collective-choice 
arena. They became involved in nego-tiations, 
discussions and made agreements that were 
satisfactory to all. Meanwhile, the village 
administration, which in the previous process 
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had played a central role, only facilitated and 
mediated the new change process, which took 
place in a transparent and democratic 
environment.  
According to my investigation, all 
groups claim to be satisfied with the local rule 
change. They consider it to be a significant 
advance. The satisfaction arises from the 
involvement in the process of representatives 
of the groups who were actually involved in 
the conflict. The fishermen, who during the 
former process of making and changing the 
rules did not have any role, also feel satisfied 
because the new agreement can accommodate 
their interests. The involvement makes them 
feel that their voice, existence, and interests 
receive sufficient attention. In addition, 
SATGAS, which was formerly never 
completely involved in the process of 
decision-making, feels satisfied as well, 
because its role as coast and marine guard is 
now appreciated. It also conceives the 
delegation of authority and responsibility to 
protect marine resources within the Gili Indah 
area according to the new rules to be a sign of 
trust from the community to handle the task. 
Thus, SATGAS officers will have no doubts 
in implementing them. 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2  The Effect of Collective- and 
Constitutional-Choice Level Rules on 
the Change in Operational Rules 
Collective-choice level rules.  
 
Collective-choice rules concerning the way 
actors and stakeholders make operational rules 
regarding coral reef management in Gili Indah 
were not clearly disclosed. I found only two 
phenomena that could be considered to be 
collective-choice rules. These are: a tradition 
of musyawarah (meetings) and Act No. 
22/1999 on regional government, particularly 
article 104 concerning a village parliament’s 
(BPD) authority to make village-level 
policies. In the followings, I explain them and 
how they may have affected the change of 
operational rules on coral reef management.   
Musyawarah is a tradition in this 
community to discuss and to find out solutions 
to village problems. When the community 
faces an important problem, the village leader, 
informal leaders, and other village elites 
representing relevant groups in the community 
will meet together at the village office to 
discuss how to resolve it. This practice can be 
effective for making agreements among 
groups in the community or for making rules-
in-use, agreed upon by all community 
members.  
As mentioned, article 104 of Act No. 
22/1999 authorizes BPDs to make village-
level policies. In response to this act, 
according to an interview with the village 
leader of Gili Indah, this village has made a 
policy requiring BPD members to meet at 
least four times a year to discuss all kinds of 
village issues, including coral reef 
management issues and other problems being 
faced by the village. I consider the tradition of 
musyawarah and the quarterly meetings of 
village parliament members as collective 
choice-level rules, which villagers may refer 
to when they need to define an operational 
rule or merely to make a change in an existing 
one. In other words, when villagers need to 
change an operational rule they will make it 
through an incidental musyawarah or a 
quarterly meeting.  
 
 
Constitutional-choice rules.  
 
Another point of interest that need to be 
looked at more closely is on the question of 
constitutional-choice rules, i.e., how actors 
and stakeholders playing the decision roles at 
the collective-choice level come into this level 
and have  authority to work there.  Both of 
these can be based on tradition and on formal 
rules. First, a tradition positions leading 
figures (formal village leaders, informal 
leaders, influential and prominent figures) as 
sources of advice for people. Villagers will 
come to them and consult with them when 
they need to find solutions to village 
problems. This tradition has indirectly placed 
the leading figures at the collective-choice 
level and has given them, to a certain extent, 
authority to play important roles, such as 
policy-making at the village level.  
Second, article 104 of the act of 
22/1999 may also function as a constitutional-
choice rule. As explained above, this act has 
authorized BPDs to make village-level 
policies. To a certain extent, this directly 
allows some leading figures, most of them are 
members of BPD, to work at the collective-
choice level. Moreover, BPD members have 
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social legitimacy because they are nominated 
by members of the communities and represent 
relevant groups existing therein. Therefore, 
this formal act could be considered to be a 
constitutional-choice rule, which to a large 
extent influences the way local elites enter and 
operate at the collective-choice level.  Thus, 
we see that the tradition positioning leading 
figures as a source of advice for people and 
article 104 of the regional government Act 
enable some actors (individuals) to come into 
the collective-choice level and have authority 
to play decision-making roles there, and can 
therefore be regarded as constitutional rules. 
At the end of this section, I will explain 
on how actors played decision-making roles at 
the collective-choice level work. According to 
Hidayat (2005), village officials and village 
elites (Figure 4) made the first awig-awig 
prohibiting blast fishing through the tradition 
of musyawarah. They held a number of 
meetings before coming into an agreement on 
making the awig-awig. The same method was 
used by LMLNU and SATGAS when they 
made the second awig-awig prohibiting blast 
fishing (Figure 5). Ecotrust, SATGAS, and 
the fishermen’s association revised the third 
awig-awig on conflict resolution (Figure 8) 
also following this procedure. Some 
interviewees argued that this end product of 
musyawarah could be accepted as a reliable 
decision as long as those involved represent 
all relevant groups in the community. 
A somewhat unusual case is the 
involvement of P2BK (Figure 6) at the 
collective-choice level. According to my 
investigation, there does not seem to be a 
single rule on how P2BK should work at the 
collective-choice level, how it should 
formulate awig-awig and interact with local 
communities. It is only an external 
organization that does not have any 
relationship with the village, except as a 
consultant that executes an order. Moreover, 
there are no constitutional rules which brought 
P2BK into the collective-choice level, giving 
it authority to work there, except a project 
contract from BAPPEDA (the project owner). 
These deficiencies may all have contributed to 
the failure of the awig-awig. 
 
5.4 Discussions and Conclusions 
 
The three described cases—regarding the two 
failed attempts to formulate awig-awig 
prohibiting blast fishing and the eventually 
successful resolution of the conflict between 
the TBOs and fishermen—lead us to the 
question: what actually are the motives behind 
the processes of institutional change? There 
are strong indications that the changes are 
affected by the local and external economic 
conditions, which inevitably force resource 
users and economic actors to alter their 
livelihood strategies. The entering of 
industrial tourism and the emergence of 
tourism-related livelihoods in Gili Indah have 
driven economic actors to adapt to the altering 
environmental situation. The economic actors, 
mainly consisting of TBOs and fishermen, 
have therefore played important roles in the 
change process. Their endeavours in doing so, 
however, cannot be separated from their 
economic interests. TBOs, whose livelihood 
depends on coral reef ecosystems, have a 
strong interest in protecting the ecosystems 
from degradation. The same goes for the 
fishermen, who also insist on maintaining the 
status quo as an attempt to protect their 
economic interest. Figure 8 schematically 
depicts the logic of institutional change 
phenomena. 
Different economic motives among the 
coral reef users have resulted in a serious 
conflict between them. Each party in the 
conflict has claimed that they have the most 
legitimate right to the resources and, 
accordingly, their economic interest deserve to 
be the priority. The lasting, chronic conflict 
has actually driven some of the actors to re-
create or modify institutions. The economic 
motive is only a trigger, driving the 
emergence of the conflict. If the different 
economic motives could be harmonized in 
such a way that each of the conflicting 
economic actors receives a fair share of 
revenue from the resources, there would no 
longer be an incentive for institutional 
alteration. The actors wanted to change the 
rules only in order to resolve the conflict. 
Both fishermen and TBOs have desired 
peaceful conditions. They admit that the 
conflict is counter-productive for their 
economic activities. The institutional change 
was merely an attempt to search for a new 
institutional arrangement that can distribute 
the benefits equally to the resource users. In 
other words, the changes are only a by-
product of distributional conflict among 
economic actors. 
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Fig.  9    Dynamic Process of Institutional Change                                            Source: Hidayat (2005) 
  
The change process itself is affected by actor 
characteristics. The self-interest of actors, 
combined with asymmetries of power and 
resources compels each of the actors to 
develop a strategy that tries to drive 
institutional change processes in the direction 
of their self-interest. The socially distributed 
benefits are only a by-product of the efforts 
made toward realizing economic interests. 
These facts actually only vindicate Knight’s 
(1992) theories of distributional conflict. The 
lasting conflict among resources user entails 
that they create a new institution or modify the 
existing one. This is a recurring phenomenon, 
in the sense that the institutional change 
process will not stop at a certain point but, 
rather, will continually occur in response to 
changes of external and internal 
environmental conditions. Change of 
economic conditions will drive the strategic 
resource users to change the institutional 
arrangements in order to continually obtain 
revenue through them.  
The accounts of Knight (1992) about 
asymmetries of power propose that actors who 
can control power resources, such as 
information, organizational capacity, time 
preferences, sanction power and resource 
ownership, may control institutional change 
processes, driving them toward their own self-
interest. In Gili Indah, the TBOs could 
successfully create a new institution, drive 
institutional change processes, force 
fishermen to stop their environmentally 
destructive fishing practices, and exclude 
them from a certain area. Both cases of 
institutional changes—on coastal zoning and 
destructive fishing practices—also vindicate 
the Knight’s accounts of distributional 
conflict. The chronic conflict encouraged each 
of the conflicting parties to create a new 
institution or to sustain the existing one. 
Clearly, fishermen prefer to retain the status 
quo, that is, in this context, a situation without 
any restrictions. The TBOs wanted to create a 
new institution, or reactivate the unworkable 
one, so as to support their economic interests 
and property rights over the resources.  
In the locality, TBOs have actually 
played the role of strategic actors who think 
rationally concerning how to maximize their 
self-interest. They create expectations 
regarding the resources, based upon which 
they make institutions that can compel other 
actors to comply in ways that will finally lead 
to the outcome they prefer. The expectation 
the TBOs formed was clearly one of 
sustainable use of the area’s coral reef 
ecosystems. They expected that the resources 
would continuously provide them with 
revenue. The issue of coral reef protection was 
regarded by them as the way to share social 
expectations among resource users.  The role 
of social institutions, in this context regarding 
constraints on coral reef use, is to provide 
social actors (TBOs and fishermen) with 
information about how to realize the social 
expectation. Without the institutions, the 
expectations (sustainable use and continuous 
yield of revenue) will not be fulfilled. 
TBOs have mastered information and 
successfully formed the institutions through 
which they have the possibility of realizing 
their expectations and gaining better payoffs. 
What became a big obstacle to deal with was 
how to transform their expectation into a 
Different 
users, 
interests
Coral reef 
resources
Rational users, self-interest, 
strategic choice, and asymmetries 
of power resources
Third-party 
enforcement and 
sanction systems
Environmental 
change and new 
interests
Conflicts 
of interest
Institutional 
change
New institutional 
arrangement
Distributed benefits 
among resource users
Recurring process, dynamic
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commonly recognized social expectation. This 
was very important in order to reduce the 
possibility of resistance from other resource 
users (i.e., fishermen). The third-party 
enforcement that the local governance applied 
(played by SATGAS) was caused by the fact 
that local community member still had 
different expectations. Self-enforcement by 
the community could only be possible if the 
expectations regarding the resources are 
socially shared. Otherwise, the system of 
governance will collapse. Accordingly, third-
party enforcement, at this moment, is still the 
right choice even though it is relative costly.  
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